Does the Capital Market Punish Managerial Myopia? by Tong, J. & Zhang, F.F.
MURDOCH RESEARCH REPOSITORY
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au
This is the author's final version of the work, as accepted for publication following peer review but without the 
publisher's layout or pagination.
Tong, J. and Zhang, F.F. (2014) Does the Capital Market Punish Managerial Myopia? FIRN Research 
Paper .
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/22202
Copyright © The Authors
It is posted here for your personal use. No further distribution is permitted.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395774 
1 
 
Does the Capital Market Punish Managerial Myopia? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yixing (Jamie) Tong 
University of Western Australia 
 
Feida (Frank) Zhang* 
Murdoch University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
*Corresponding author: School of Management and Governance, Murdoch University, Murdoch, Perth, WA.  
Email: Frank.Zhang@murdoch.edu.au, Tel: 61-8-9360-2868. We thank seminar participants at Tsinghua 
University, Renmin University, Jinan University, Wuhan University, and Hong Kong Baptist University. The 
authors would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of 
China (approval number: 71002058, 71202090, 71202091).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395774 
2 
 
Does the Capital Market Punish Managerial Myopia? 
 
 
Abstract 
The extant literature provides conflicting arguments on whether the capital market 
punishes managers’ myopic behavior. Stein (1988, 1989) argues that the capital 
market is myopic and will push managers to behave myopically. In contrast, Jensen 
(1988) believes that the capital market is efficient and will punish managerial myopia. 
However, empirical studies on how the stock market reacts to managerial myopia are 
scarce. This study aims to fill in this gap by examining how the capital market reacts 
to managerial myopia. Using managers’ cutting R&D to meet short-term earnings 
goals as a research setting, this study reveals that the capital market actually penalizes 
managerial myopia, especially for firms with high investor sophistication. Our results 
are consistent with Jensen’s (1988) contention that the security market is not 
shortsighted. Additionally, we document that compensation, especially cash 
compensation, could be one of the reasons why managers behave myopically. 
 
JEL classifications: G32; M41 
 
Keywords: Managerial Myopia; Capital Market; Investor Sophistication; CEO Compensation.  
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Does the Capital Market Punish Managerial Myopia?  
I. Introduction 
Defined as managers’ desire to achieve a high current stock price by inflating 
current earnings at the expense of long-term cash flows or earnings (Bhojraj & Libby, 
2005; Stein, 1989), managerial myopia is believed to be a first-order problem faced 
by the modern firm (Edmans, 2009). Indeed, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) 
survey and interview more than 400 executives, and document that 78% of executives 
would forgo a project with positive net present value if the project would cause them 
to miss short-term earnings targets. Empirical studies of managerial myopic behavior 
have focused mainly on R&D expenditure and the evidence is consistent with 
managers myopically cutting investment in R&D to achieve various income 
objectives (Baber, Fairfield, & Haggard, 1991; Bange & De Bondt, 1998; Bens, Nagar, 
& Wong, 2002; Cooper & Selto, 1991; Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Jacobs, 1991; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). 
The origins of managerial myopia have been debated, and central to the debate is 
the view that US equity markets force corporate managers to behave myopically 
(Jacobs 1991; Porter 1992). The view arises from the belief that investors cannot see 
beyond current earnings and will depress stock prices when there is any reduction in 
short-term earnings. Because R&D investments are expensed under current Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), managers have incentives to avoid such 
investments in spite of the long-term payoffs. Essentially, managers underinvest in 
R&D to create the impression that the firm’s current and future profitability is greater 
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than it actually is, hoping this will boost today’s share price (Stein 1989). Hence, 
managers are pressured into trading long-term performance for short-term 
performance in order to meet stock market expectation, and especially in order to 
secure impatient capital. 
Prominent CEOs have expressed their concerns about the pressure from the 
capital market. For example, Anne Mulcahy, former Chairperson and CEO of Xerox, 
stated that fixating on short-term performance is one of “the most dysfunctional 
things” in the marketplace, and it may hurt U.S. firms in the long run1. During 
Google’s IPO offering in 2004, management of Google said it did not want to lose 
focus on its long-term goals and therefore declined to provide frequent earnings 
guidance (Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, & Venugopalan, 2009). Such concerns are also 
shared by regulators. An independent commission established by the US chamber of 
Commerce recommends discontinuing quarterly earnings guidance and believes 
reducing the pressures to meet precise quarterly earnings target is an important first 
step in shifting the focus of the US capital markets away from quarterly results and 
toward the long-term performance of US companies (Cheng, Subramanyam, & Zhang, 
2007). 
If capital market does pressure managers to behave myopically, we would expect 
a negative stock price reaction to managers’ myopic behaviors. However, prior 
empirical studies provide mixed results. Some scholars find that the stock market 
reacts positively to announcements of R&D increases (Jarrell & Lehn, 1985; 
                                                             
1 Information source: http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=1318&specialId=41. 
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Woolridge, 1988) even when such announcements occur in the face of an earnings 
disappointment (Chan, J. Martin, & Kensinger, 1990). But recently, by examining 
five-day returns surrounding the release of the earnings announcements, Bhojraj, 
Hribar, Picconi, & McInnis (2009) show that firms that just beat analyst forecasts 
(“beaters”) exhibit a short-term stock price benefit relative to firms that miss forecasts 
(“missers”) even though beaters have a low earnings quality signal (e.g., below 
median changes in R&D) whereas missers have high earnings quality (e.g., above 
median changes in R&D). Further, such trend reverses over a three-year horizon. 
Their findings suggest that managerial myopia is punished by the capital market in a 
long term but not in a short run. While these studies document interesting and 
insightful results, their conclusions have been limited because the R&D change 
examined is not necessarily a sacrifice in order to achieve the short-term earnings 
target. Essentially, managerial myopia is sacrificing long-term growth for the purpose 
of meeting short-term goals (Porter, 1992). This concept has three aspects: (1) there 
should be underinvestment in long-term value creation projects; (2) the 
underinvestment should occur with the objective of meeting short-term goals; and (3) 
such underinvestment must be sub-optimal in the sense of impairing long-term growth 
and value creation. Previous literature generally uses R&D underinvestment to 
capture myopia, but such underinvestment might not occur with the objective of 
meeting current earnings - a violation to aspect (2). In terms of this, in this paper, we 
use managers’ cutting R&D specifically to meet earnings targets as a setting to 
examine the market reactions to managerial myopia. 
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Following the research design of prior literature (Baber et al., 1991; Bushee, 
1998; Goel & Ram, 2001), we sample firms for which earnings before R&D and taxes 
have declined relative to the prior year, but have declined by an amount that can be 
reversed by a reduction in R&D. By definition, these firms have the incentive, as well 
as the ability, to cut R&D in order to meet earnings targets. More importantly, if these 
firms do cut R&D, then most likely such cutting is for the objective of meeting 
earnings targets and therefore could be regarded as myopic. We then focus on two 
subgroups of firms: (1) firms that cut R&D and meet the previous year’s earnings 
(hereafter, myopic cutters) and (2) firms that do not cut R&D, and thus miss the 
previous year’s earnings (hereafter, non-cutters). If the market does not punish 
myopic R&D cutting, we should observe a better short-term stock price performance 
for subgroup (1) because subgroup (1) has systematically higher earnings surprises. If 
it turns out that Subgroup (1) has worse performance, however, the suggestion is that 
the capital market does punish myopic behavior because the only reason that 
subgroup (1) has higher earnings surprises than subgroup (2) is due to managerial 
myopia - cutting R&D to meet earnings targets.2 
Applying an event study, we find that myopic cutters systematically 
underperform in a five-day window surrounding the release of the earnings 
announcement. This indicates that investors are able to see through the earnings 
manipulation by R&D cut and penalize such myopic behavior. We also estimate 
                                                             
2 This sampling strategy makes it impossible to use zero as the earnings benchmark. Although analyst forecast is 
also a popular benchmark, analysts may change their forecasts from month to month. As a result, it is difficult for 
managers to make R&D cut decisions according to analysts’ forecasts. Moreover, many analysts do not provide 
their forecasted R&D expenditure and thus make unavailable the forecasted earnings before R&D. This explains 
why we use earnings of the prior year rather than zero or analyst forecast as the benchmark in this study. 
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ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to control the factors that could influence 
five-day returns. The results show that myopic cutters still have significantly lower 
five-day returns after controlling variables identified in prior studies.  
If the capital market is efficient and does discount managerial myopia, we should 
expect the discount to be higher for firms with more sophisticated investors because 
more sophisticated investors are better able to “see through” managers’ myopic R&D 
cutting behavior and less likely to fixate on earnings. Therefore, we further examine 
whether investor sophistication affects the market reaction to the managerial myopia. 
We expect that managers in firms with more sophisticated investors are more likely to 
be punished by the market for cutting R&D to meet/beat short-term earnings targets. 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that the phenomenon of the capital market 
punishing managerial myopic behavior exists only in the sub-sample of firms with 
high investor sophistication. This finding further supports that the capital market 
would punish manager’s myopic R&D cutting because investors are sophisticated 
enough to see through the behavior.  
A question remained unsolved, however, is why managers still choose to behave 
myopically. Therefore, we further explore the incentives of managerial myopia. We 
find that CEOs who cut R&D to meet the previous year’s earnings receive 
significantly higher cash pay (the sum of salary and annual bonus) and total pay (the 
sum of cash pay and noncash pay) after controlling other important determinants of 
CEO compensation. Our results indicate that the incomplete compensation contract is 
one of the reasons why CEO behaves myopically.  
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Our paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it has long 
been argued that the market pressure causes managers to behave myopically. This 
argument assumes that the capital market would not punish managers who behave 
myopically. Previous literature uses decreased R&D investment or a lower 
industry-adjusted R&D change (Bhojraj et al., 2009) to measure managerial myopia 
and provide mixed results. However, managers may reduce R&D investments for the 
objective of meeting some short-term goals and therefore could not capture 
managerial myopia defined in Porter (1992). In terms of this, we identify a specific 
setting in which managers’ cutting R&D investment is most likely for meeting current 
period earnings so that we can better capture managers’ myopic behaviors. Our results 
show significantly lower mean and median values of five-day returns for myopic 
cutters, suggesting that the capital market does penalize the myopic behavior of 
managers (e.g., cutting R&D to meet the previous year’s earnings). 
Second, manipulating real operations such as R&D investment is a popular way 
of earnings management (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008), but there are few studies on the 
economic consequences of real earnings management. Our study extends this stream 
of research by showing that the market attaches a lower value to firms engaging in 
myopic R&D cutting.  
Finally, our results suggest that CEO compensation might be one of the possible 
reasons why CEOs involve in myopic behavior. In this aspect, our study provides a 
new explanation on managerial myopia and could contribute to the literature on both 
managerial myopia and CEO compensation. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
the background, the research motivation, and the related literature. Section III 
describes the sample and data. Results are reported in Section IV. Section V extends 
the results to examine the managerial incentive to act myopically, and Section VI 
concludes. 
II. Literature and Hypothesis 
A large amount of literature provides evidence of managerial myopia with 
respect to R&D spending. For example, R&D spending is significantly lower when 
the spending jeopardizes managerial ability to report positive earnings or increase 
income in the current period (Baber et al., 1991), or when CEOs are in the final years 
of their administrative tenure (Dechow & Sloan, 1991). Moreover, myopic R&D 
spending is more pronounced in firms that are held by institutional investors with a 
shorter investment horizon (Bushee, 1998). Similarly, managers are found to 
manipulate short-term earnings through R&D activities (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993). In an experimental setting, Bjojraj and Libby (2005) 
find that managers will make more myopic project choices in response to increased 
capital market pressure resulting from a pending stock issuance, holding constant 
agency frictions and other stock market pressures. 
To examine whether the market punishes managers if managers do engage in 
myopic R&D activities, Jarrell & Lehn (1985) report that stock prices responded 
positively to 62 announcements (between 1973 and 1983) that firms were embarking 
on new R&D projects. Woolridge (1998) examines 45 announcements (between 1972 
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and 1984) involving expenditures for new as well as continuing R&D projects and 
reports positive share price responses. Chan et al (1990) examine share price 
responses to announcements of increased R&D spending. They find that, on average, 
such responses are positive even if increased R&D expenditures occur at the same 
time as a decline in earnings. Further, they discover that when their sample of 
announcements are divided up into those associated with high technology and those 
associated with low technology firms, positive stock price responses are associated 
with increased R&D expenditures for high technology firms whereas negative stock 
price responses are associated with increased R&D expenditures for low technology 
firms. This latter result suggests that the capital market not only treat R&D 
expenditures as long-lived investments but also do so in a discriminating fashion. 
However, the documented earnings decline is not necessarily due to the increased 
R&D. In other word, the R&D cutting here is not necessarily myopic. Similarly, 
Bhojraj et al (2009) find that stock market reaction is positive to beaters even though 
their change in R&D is above the median level for all firms. But the above-median 
change in R&D does not represent a decrease in R&D, and more importantly, the 
change in RD is not necessarily a sacrifice to achieve a short-term earnings target. 
Taken together, although prior studies examined the market reaction to change in 
R&D investments, they did not directly investigate market reaction to change in R&D 
investments because of managerial myopia (i.e. sacrificing long-term growth for the 
purpose of meeting short-term goals). 
We argue that the capital market could see through managerial myopia and thus 
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penalize the behavior accordingly. Despite widespread allegations of stock market 
“short termism,” research persuasively supports a view that capital markets consider 
R&D investments as significant value-increasing activities (Cheng, 2004). Further, 
market participants would search for methods to mitigate potential wasteful reduction 
of long-term profitable investment (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007). For example, 
managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline when institutional 
ownership is high. Specifically, institutional ownership serves to reduce pressures on 
managers for myopic investment behavior if institutional investors have low turnover 
and momentum trading (Bushee, 1998). Osma (2008) provides evidence suggesting 
that independent directors have sufficient technical knowledge to identify 
opportunistic reductions in R&D, and to efficiently constrain myopic R&D spending. 
In addition, the presence of financial analysts, auditors, and other experts who 
estimate R&D project values could lessen the information asymmetry that generates 
mispricing and therefore suppress managerial myopia (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 
2007). Managers could also credibly reveal their belief that the firm is undervalued by 
initiating stock repurchases or by accepting compensation contingent on project 
outcome (Meulbroek, Mitchell, Mulherin, Netter, & Poulsen, 1990). In line with this 
logic, we expect that: 
H1: The capital market reacts negatively to the behavior of cutting R&D to 
meet earnings target. 
The discussion leading up to H1 assumes that the investors are capable of 
searching for and analyzing information. However, as prior studies indicate, investor 
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sophistication varies across firms (Callen, Hope, and Segal 2005; Bartov, 
Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky 2000). Although the threshold of investor sophistication 
for an efficient capital market is unknown, we could empirically test whether the 
extent of investor sophistication matters. Sophisticated investors are more likely to see 
through the myopia R&D cut behavior than unsophisticated investors do. If the 
investors’ reactions to managerial myopia varies across firms in a manner consistent 
with the effects of investor sophistication, it will increase the reliability of our 
empirical results. Following prior studies, we construct the second hypothesis as 
follows: 
H2. The phenomena that the capital market reacts negatively to the behavior 
of cutting R&D to meet earnings target exists mainly in firms with sophisticated 
investors. 
III. Empirical Analysis 
A. Sample and Measures 
Our sample consists of firm-year observations drawn from the Compustat 
Database from 1972 to 2008. The earliest year is set at 1972 because prior to that year 
relatively few firms on Compustat reported information on R&D outlays (Kothari et 
al., 2002). All price and returns data are from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). To ensure that micro-cap or penny stocks did not bias our results, we 
dropped firms with assets less than $10 million or the share price less than $1. 
Utilities and banks are also omitted from our sample, because their financial 
statements tend to be different from those of other types of firms. As mentioned, we 
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include in our sample only firms that have both incentive and ability to cut R&D to 
meet short-term earnings. Thus, firms are excluded unless their earnings before R&D 
and taxes have declined relative to the prior year, but by an amount that can be 
reversed by a 20%3 reduction in R&D. Specifically, we compute EBTRD (Earnings 
before Tax and R&D). Firms that do not satisfy the inequality 
“–0.2*(RDt-1)<=(EBTRDt-EBTRD t-1)<0” are excluded. Furthermore, we exclude 
firms that cut R&D and missed the previous year’s earnings4. Finally, observations 
were deleted if either: (1) Compustat reports missing values for sales, total assets, 
book value of equity, or market value of equity; or (2) data needed to compute the 
variables are missing. The sample-selection criteria yield a total of 2,691 observations, 
with 708 myopic cutters and 1,347 non-cutters. 
We classify firms into categories based on whether they cut R&D and meet the 
previous year’s earnings. We construct a dummy variable CutRD, which is 1 if 
managers cut R&D at year t (i.e., R&D expenditure is lower relative to the prior year) 
and earnings at year t are not less than that of year t-1. CutRD equals 0 if managers do 
not cut R&D at year t. Thus, CutRD in this paper is the measure of managerial 
myopia. 
Testing our hypotheses also requires the measure of market reaction. To increase 
the robustness of our study, we use three different measures to capture market reaction: 
raw returns, market-adjusted abnormal returns, and size-adjusted abnormal returns. 
                                                             
3 When the ratio of the distance from the earnings goal relative to the prior year’s R&D ((EBTRDt-1-EBTRD 
t)/RDt-1) is higher than 20%, the probability of R&D cut is low (13.47%). This indicates that, if the ratio is high, it 
will be difficult for managers to cut R&D to meet earnings targets. To ensure that managers have both the 
incentive and the ability to cut R&D to meet the previous year’s earnings, we require the ratio to be less than or 
equal to 20%. We also apply 10%, 15%, or 25% as the thresholds and get qualitatively similar results.  
4 If we include these firms in the sample and treat them as myopic cutters, the results remain unchanged. 
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All the returns are calculated using a five-day window that begins two days before the 
earnings announcement and ends two days after the earnings announcement. Five-day 
(adjusted) returns are calculated as the (adjusted) cumulative return in the five-day 
window. The market-adjusted (size-adjusted) return is calculated using daily CRSP 
returns, and is adjusted by subtracting the cumulative market return (market return of 
firms in the same CRSP size decile) over the same period.  
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table I provides descriptive statistics separately for myopic cutters and 
non-cutters. For the mean values, the myopic cutters have slightly lower firm size (as 
indicated by Total Assets and Market Value), slightly higher book-to-market ratio 
(BM), significantly lower R&D investment (RD), earnings (Earnings), previous year’s 
earnings (Lag_Earnings), and distance (Distance), as well as significantly higher 
earnings surprises (Surprise). For the median values, all the variables (except 
book-to-market ratio) show significant difference between myopic cutters and 
non-cutters.  
C. Research Design 
We first examine how investors react to myopic R&D cut by comparing 
abnormal returns of myopia cutters and non-cutters. Because myopic cutters have 
significantly higher earnings surprise than non-cutters (See Table I: t-statistics 
z-statistics of mean/median difference of Surprise is 14.669/36.181), the market 
reaction of myopic cutters should be more positive than that of non-cutters. Therefore, 
a determination that the market reaction to myopic cutters is more negative than that 
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toward non-cutters indicates that the investors punish the behavior of myopia R&D 
cut. Our research design provides a conservative way to detect the punishment of 
managerial myopia by investors.  
To mitigate the concern that there might be many other factors affecting the 
abnormal returns, we further apply the regression method to examine the influences of 
R&D cut on the market reaction. Following Larker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011), we 
test our research question by estimating the following regression: 




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(1) 
where: 
i = Index of firm i; 
t  Index of year t; 
RET = Five-day (adjusted) returns are calculated as the (adjusted) 
cumulative return beginning two days before the earnings 
announcement and ending two days after the earnings 
announcement. The market-adjusted (size-adjusted) abnormal 
return is calculated using daily CRSP returns, and is adjusted by 
subtracting the cumulative market return (market return of firms in 
the same CRSP size decile) over the same period;  
CutRD = A dummy variable that equals one if firms cut R&D to meet the 
previous year’s earnings, and zero if firms do not cut R&D and fail 
to meet the previous year’s earnings;  
ERDSurprise = Earnings before R&D of year t minus earnings before R&D of year 
t-1; 
△RD  = R&D of year t minus R&D of year t-1; 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of market value at the end of year t; 
BM = Book value divided by market value; 
Momentum = Market-adjusted return over the prior six months. 
 
D. Empirical Results 
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Empirical results on Hypothesis 1 are reported in Table II. Panel A of Table II 
presents both the mean and median values of five-day returns5 surrounding the 
release of earnings announcement for myopic cutters and non-cutters, respectively. It 
shows that the mean values of raw returns, size-adjusted returns, and market-adjusted 
returns are all negative for myopic cutters (two of them are significant at the 10% 
level). In contrast, for non-cutters, only the mean of market-adjusted returns is 
negative but insignificant. The median values of the five-day returns are all negative 
for both subgroups. More importantly, column (5) of Panel A reveals significantly 
lower mean values of five-day returns for myopic cutters (t-statistics of -2.613, -2.857, 
and -2.101). The values of the mean differences of the five-day returns between the 
two subgroups are around 1%, which is economically significant. Similarly, the 
median values of five-day returns are also significantly lower for myopic cutters 
(z-statistics of -2.461, -2.231, and -2.169). Because both the mean and median values 
of earnings surprises of myopic cutters are significantly higher (0.253 vs. -0.329 for 
mean values and 0.100 vs. -0.270 for median values, shown in Table 1), our results 
indicate that the capital market does penalize the myopic behavior of managers (e.g., 
cutting R&D to meet the previous year’s earnings).  
The more informative results are shown in Panel B of Table III, which presents 
the coefficient estimates for equation (1). In all three columns, the coefficients on 
CutRD are significantly negative (The coefficients on CutRD are -0.017, -0.014 and 
-0.015 respectively, all significant at 1% level), indicating that R&D cutters generally 
                                                             
5 We also try three-day stock returns, and the (untabulated) results are qualitatively similar. 
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have lower abnormal returns than non-cutters. Our results further support the view 
that capital markets would punish managerial myopia. 
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior literature. 
The positive coefficients on ERDSuprise are consistent with prior studies on earnings 
response coefficients (ERCs). The positive coefficients on SIZE and BM are consistent 
with Larker et al. (2011). The coefficients on Momentum are significantly positive, 
indicating the existence of momentum phenomena. Moreover, the coefficients on  
△RD are significant and positive in all the three columns.  
IV. Effects of Investor Sophistication on Market Reaction to Managerial Myopia 
Prior studies find that the investor sophistication is not homogenous in the capital 
markets. If investors of a firm are naive, they would be less likely to see through 
managers’ myopic behavior and to punish accordingly. Following previous literature, 
we use the percentage of shares held by institutions6) (Inst_Percent) to proxy for 
investor sophistication (e.g., Hand 1990; Walther 1997; Bartov, Radakrishnan, and 
Krinsky 2000; Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller 1994; Callen, Hope, and Segal 2005). 
Consistent with the extant literature, institutional investors comprise banks, insurance 
companies, and investment companies, including their managers, independent 
advisors, and others. The institutional holding data are from 13-f filings to the SEC, 
provided by CDA Spectrum database. Our sample for testing hypothesis 2 consists of 
1,924 firm-year observations covering the years from 1972 to 2008. 
                                                             
6 We use the number of institutions holdings shares as an alternative proxy for investor sophistication, and the 
empirical results remain qualitatively unchanged (untabulated). Moreover, we also use total asset size and analyst 
following as proxies for investor sophistication. The alternative measures of investor sophistication do not change 
our empirical results qualitatively (untabulated). 
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Table III reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the investor 
sophistication tests. The mean (median) value of raw returns is -0.001 (0.000). The 
mean and median values of market-adjusted (size-adjusted) returns are -0.003 (-0.006) 
and -0.007 (-0.008), respectively. This is consistent with the construction of our 
sample, which includes only firms suffering small decreases in earnings before R&D 
expenses. The mean of CutRD is 0.387, indicating that 38.7% of firms in our sample 
manage to meet or beat the prior year’s earnings by cutting R&D. Similar to prior 
studies, the mean (median) value of Inst_percent is 0.449 (0.415). The remaining 
variables also seem to be reasonable and consistent with the literature. For example, 
the mean size of the sample firms is 5.647 and the average book-to-market ratio is 
0.570. 
We conduct sub-sample regressions to examine the effects of investor 
sophistication on the market reaction to managerial myopia. Specifically, we divide 
our sample into high-IS and low-IS sub-samples. The high-IS (low-IS) sub-sample 
consists of firm-years for which Inst_Percent is higher (lower) than the median in 
year t, thus representing the observations for which investors are more (less) 
sophisticated. By estimating the equation (1) in the strong/weak investor 
sophistication subgroups, respectively, we expect that our results hold in the high-IS 
sample. Because the threshold of investor sophistication ensuring the ability to see 
through the managerial behavior is unknown, we make no prediction on the results in 
low-IS sample. 
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The sub-sample regression results are presented in Table IV. It shows that the 
coefficients on CutRD are all significantly negative in high-IS sub-sample (t-statistics 
of -3.817, -3.248, and -4.304, respectively), while insignificant in low-IS sub-sample 
(t-statistics of -0.529, -0.429, and -0.312, respectively). The results suggest that 
investors of companies with high investor sophistication react negatively to myopic 
R&D cut. However, we fail to find empirical evidence that managerial myopia is 
punished when investor sophistication is low. This result indicates that the investors’ 
reactions to managerial myopia vary across firms in a manner consistent with prior 
finance theory and findings. 
V. Extension: Managerial Incentive to Behave Myopically 
The above findings suggest that the market is efficient, and thus might not 
pressure managers to cut R&D in a way that is myopic. A question that has remained 
unanswered, however, is what causes managers to act myopically. Therefore, in this 
section we further examine the possible reasons for managerial myopic R&D cut. 
Earnings is an important determinant of top executive compensation, because 
earnings-based performance measures help to shield executives from fluctuations that 
are beyond their control (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Missing an earnings 
benchmark may become a signal of poor performance that induces the compensation 
committee to penalize managers. Consistent with this argument, Matsunaga and Park 
(2001) find that CEOs’ annual bonuses are positively related to the likelihood of 
meeting a quarterly earnings benchmark. Further, meeting the earnings benchmark 
could constitute a public signal that allows the compensation committee to justify 
20 
 
higher compensation levels to shareholders and, thereby, to overcome political 
constraints on CEO compensation (Porter & Kramer, 2006). Thus, by meeting 
earnings targets, managers are able to increase their personal wealth in the form of 
cash pay. In view of this, we expect compensation to be a potential reason of 
managerial myopia.  
In addition to cash pay, we also examine whether managerial myopia affects 
managers’ total pay and noncash pay. Total pay is the sum of cash pay and noncash 
pay, and thus is a more comprehensive measure of CEO compensation. Noncash pay 
is the sum of the value of equity grants during the year, the fringe benefits, and other 
long-term incentive plans, with stock options valued at the end of the fiscal year using 
the Black-Scholes 1973 model adjusted for dividends. Previous literature indicates 
that noncash pay is an important component of CEO incentives (Murphy, 1999).  
We test our prediction by estimating the following model: 






tititi
titititititi
TenureOwnershipLEV
QSIZERETROACutRDpay
,81,71,6
1,51,4,3,2,10,
 
(2) 
where:                                                         
i = Index of firm i; 
j = Index of year t; 
△payi,t = The change of CEO’s total pay, the change of CEO’s cash pay, 
or the change of CEO’s noncash pay. The change of CEO pay 
(total pay, cash pay, or noncash pay) is calculated as the 
logarithm of pay (total pay, cash pay, or noncash pay) in year t 
minus the logarithm of CEO pay (total pay, cash pay, or noncash 
pay) in year t-1; 
Cash Payi,t = CEO cash pay, including salary and annual bonuses; 
Noncash Payi,t = CEO noncash pay, including value of equity grants during the 
year, fringe benefits, and other long-term incentive plans; 
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Total Payi,t = The sum of cash pay and noncash pay; 
△ROAi,t = ROAi,t -ROAi,t-1; 
ROAi,t = Net income divided by total assets; 
RETi,t = Annual stock return; 
SIZEi,t = Logarithm of total assets; 
Qi,t = The book value of assets minus the book value of equity, plus the 
market value of equity, scaled by the book value of assets; 
LEVi,t = Total debts divided by total assets; 
Ownershipi,t = CEO ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding; 
Tenurei,t = Number of years as the CEO of the firm. 
 
The model and control variables in (2) are based on previous literature (Cheng, 
2004; Cheng & Indjejikian, 2009; Sloan, 1993). The dependent variable △payi,t 
could be the change of CEO cash pay, the change of CEO total pay, or the change of 
noncash pay. We use a natural logarithmic transformation to control for skewness in 
CEO compensation7. If managers who cut R&D to meet the previous year’s earnings 
receive more compensation, then γ1 would be significantly positive.  
We control △ROA and Return because accounting and stock performance 
measures have positive effects on CEO compensation (Baber, Janakiraman, & Kang, 
1996; Lambert & Larcker, 1987). We also control other variables that have been 
identified by previous literature as being associated with CEO compensation (Cheng 
& Indjejikian, 2009; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Murphy, 1999). These include 
firm-level characteristics such as size, Tobin’s Q, leverage, market-to-book ratio, and 
CEO characteristics such as equity ownership and CEO tenure.  
We test our prediction on a sample of 248 ﬁrm years from 1993–20088 that have 
both incentive and ability to cut R&D in order to meet the previous year’s earnings. 
                                                             
7 The results remain unchanged when this transformation is not applied. 
8 The earliest year is set at 1993 because Execucomp provides executive compensation data since 1992 
and we need to calculate the change of compensation using one-year-lag data. 
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We obtain the annual compensation information from the Execucomp database. Since 
we are analyzing the change in compensation, we require that a firm have two 
consecutive years of compensation data. For this reason, as well, we restrict our 
sample to those executives who have been the CEO for both of the consecutive years. 
The other sample selection criteria are the same as section III. 
The results are shown in Table V. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the results of 
total pay, cash pay and noncash pay, respectively. In Columns (1) and (2), the 
coefficients on CutRD are positive and significant (p-value less than 0.10), indicating 
that managers generally receive benefits from acting myopically. In Column (3), the 
coefficient on CutRD is negative but insignificant. Overall, our results indicate that 
compensation, especially cash compensation, might be one of the possible reasons for 
managerial myopia. 
VI. Conclusions 
Many academics and practitioners believe that myopia is a first-order problem 
faced by the modern firm (Edmans, 2009), and it is concern for the stock price that 
leads to myopia. Using managers’ R&D cutting to meet short-term earnings targets as 
a setting, our study examines whether the market actually discounts managerial 
myopia. 
The study is based on a sample of U.S. firms with declined pre-tax, pre-R&D 
earnings relative to the prior year—but earnings that have declined by an amount that 
can be reversed by cutting 20% of the previous year’s R&D. We investigate whether 
the market reacts negatively to managerial myopia around the earnings announcement 
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date, and whether it attaches a lower value to firms that cut R&D myopically. Using 
five-day returns surrounding the announcement of earnings as an indicator of market 
reaction, we provide empirical evidence suggesting that the market is not myopic, and 
that it does penalize firms if managers engage in myopic R&D cutting for the purpose 
of short-term goals. Moreover, our further tests indicate that the phenomenon of 
investors punishing managerial myopia can be detected only when investor 
sophistication is high. 
Given that the capital market could “see through” managerial myopia, we further 
explore why managers continue to behave myopically. We conduct regressions to 
examine the effects of managerial myopia on CEO cash pay, noncash pay, and total 
pay. Our results suggest that CEOs who cut R&D myopically receive significantly 
higher total pay and cash pay, indicating that the incomplete compensation contract is 
one of the reasons for managerial myopia. 
Although researchers argue that it cannot be true that the market is myopic, 
empirical evidence is limited. By investigating the market reaction to the managerial 
myopia, our study fills the niche and contributes to the literature on managerial 
myopia. Further, this study extends the literature on the economic consequences of 
real earnings management by indicating that the market discounts real earnings 
management behaviors. 
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Table I Descriptive Statistics for Myopic Cutters and Non-Cutters 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the two subgroups: firms that cut R&D to meet the previous year’s earnings (myopic cutters), and firms that do 
not cut R&D and fail to meet the previous year’s earnings (non-cutters). The sample includes firm-years for which earnings before R&D and taxes have 
declined relative to the prior year, but by an amount that can be reversed by a 20% reduction in R&D. The t-statistics (z-statistics) of the mean (median) 
differences are also provided. All values are obtained using Compustat data for the given fiscal year. Total Assets is Compustat item #AT. Market Value is 
shares outstanding (#CSHO) multiplying fiscal year closing stock price (#PRCC_F). BM is book value (#CEQ) divided by market value. RD is research and 
development expenditure (#XRD) divided by total asset. Earnings (Lag_Earnings)) is earnings per share before extraordinary item (#EPSPX) of a given fiscal 
year (the prior fiscal year). Surprise is earnings surprise, measured as earnings minus Lag_Earnings. Distance is change of earnings before R&D divided by 
R&D at the beginning of the fiscal year. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, two-tailed. 
 
 Myopic Cutters Non-Cutters Difference 
Variable 
(1) 
Mean 
(2) 
Median 
(3) 
Std Dev. 
(4) 
Mean 
(5) 
Median 
(6) 
Std Dev. 
(1)-(4) 
t-statistics 
(2)-(5) 
z-statistics 
Total Assets 2270.010 80.808 12296.200 2626.440 122.225 12927.120 -0.638 -4.686*** 
Market Value 1997.200 118.262 7374.880 1977.780 190.230 6681.930 0.062 -5.525*** 
BM 0.648 0.494 0.541 0.622 0.505 0.481 1.227 0.125 
RD 0.142 0.086 0.156 0.153 0.099 0.162 -1.592 -2.852*** 
Earnings 0.347 0.070 1.640 0.596 0.340 1.695 -3.398*** -4.839*** 
Lag_Earnings 0.094 -0.030 1.766 0.925 0.610 1.846 -10.465*** -11.880*** 
Surprise 0.253 0.100 1.503 -0.329 -0.270 0.882 14.669*** 36.181*** 
Distance 0.084 0.077 0.056 0.095 0.091 0.058 -4.652*** -4.614*** 
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Table II Market Reaction to Managerial Myopia 
 
Panel A presents the five-day returns surrounding the earnings announcement for myopic cutters and non-cutters. The raw return is calculated using daily 
CRSP returns. The market-adjusted (size-adjusted) abnormal return is calculated using daily CRSP returns and adjusted by subtracting the cumulative market 
return (market return of firms in the same CRSP size decile) over the same period. Five-day (adjusted) returns are calculated as the (adjusted) cumulative 
return beginning two days before the earnings announcement and ending two days after the earnings announcement. T-statistics or z-statistics are presented in 
the brackets. Panel B presents results from a regression of five-day returns surrounding the earnings announcement on myopic R&D cut and control variables. 
CutRD is a dummy variable that equals one if firms cut R&D to meet the previous year’s earnings, and zero if firms do not cut R&D and fail to meet the 
previous year’s earnings. ERDSurprise is earnings before R&D of a given year minus earnings before R&D of the prior fiscal year, △RD is R&D of year t 
minus R&D of year t-1, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value, BM is book value divided by market value, and Momentum is the market-adjusted 
return over the prior six months. Heteroskedastic-robust and cluster-adjusted t-statistics appear in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively, two-tailed. 
 
Panel A. Event Day Returns 
Type of Returns 
 
Myopic Cutters 
N=805 
 
Non-Cutters 
N=1886 Difference 
 (1) 
Mean 
(2) 
Median 
(3) 
Mean 
(4) 
Median 
(1)-(3) 
(t-statistics) 
(2)-(4) 
(z-statistics) 
Raw Returns -0.005 -0.003** 0.006** 0.000 -0.011*** -0.003** 
 [-1.442] [-2.584] [2.513] [-0.483] [-2.613] [-2.461] 
Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.012** 
 [-3.830] [-6.848] [-1.056] [-3.775] [-2.857] [-2.231] 
Size-Adjusted Abnormal Return -0.006* -0.009*** 0.003 -0.003** -0.009** -0.006** 
 [-1.706] [-4.936] [1.126] [-2.231] [-2.101] [-2.169] 
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Panel B. Cross-Sectional Variation in Event Day Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Raw Returns Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns Size-Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
CutRD -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 [-3.946] [-3.231] [-3.496] 
ERDSurprise 0.009** 0.008** 0.007* 
 [2.217] [2.102] [1.817] 
△RD 0.009* 0.008* 0.009* 
 [1.798] [1.675] [1.834] 
SIZE 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 [4.009] [3.502] [3.874] 
BM 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 [3.186] [2.915] [4.308] 
Momentum 0.014** 0.017*** 0.008 
 [2.299] [2.774] [1.314] 
Constant -0.015** -0.021*** -0.028*** 
 [-2.288] [-3.190] [-4.379] 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,639 2,639 2,639 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.012 0.013 
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Table III Summary Statistics for the Investor Sophistication Tests 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the data used in the tests determining how investor sophistication affects market reaction to managerial myopia. 
The sample consists of 1,924 firm-year observations covering the years from 1972 to 2008. All variables except dummy variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile values. The raw return is calculated using daily CRSP returns. The market-adjusted (size-adjusted) abnormal return is calculated using 
daily CRSP returns and adjusted by subtracting the cumulative market return (market return of firms in the same CRSP size decile) over the same period. 
Five-day (adjusted) returns are calculated as the (adjusted) cumulative return beginning two days before the earnings announcement and ending two days after 
the earnings announcement. CutRD is a dummy variable that equals one if firms cut R&D to meet the previous year’s earnings, and zero if firms do not cut 
R&D and fail to meet the previous year’s earnings. Inst_Percent is the percentage of shares held by institutions at the end of given fiscal year, ERDSurprise is 
earnings before R&D of given year minus earnings before R&D of last fiscal year, △RD is R&D of a given year minus R&D of the prior fiscal year, SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of market value, BM is book value divided by market value, and Momentum is the market adjusted return over the prior six months. 
 
Variable 
(1) 
Mean 
(2) 
Std Dev. 
(3) 
25th 
(4) 
Median 
(5) 
75th 
Raw Returns -0.001  0.098  -0.054  0.000  0.050  
Market-Adjusted Returns -0.003  0.093  -0.054  -0.007  0.046  
Size-Adjusted Returns -0.006 0.087 -0.055 -0.008 0.042 
CutRD 0.387  0.487  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Inst_Percent 0.449  0.353  0.213  0.415  0.653  
ERDSurprise -0.175  0.387  -0.186  -0.075  -0.021  
△RD -0.014  0.447  -0.114  0.020  0.149  
SIZE 5.647  1.995  4.238  5.352  6.773  
BM 0.570  0.412  0.274  0.478  0.749  
Momentum -0.003  0.379  -0.229  -0.050  0.133  
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Table IV Effects of Investor Sophistication on Market Reaction to Managerial Myopia 
 
This table presents the results on the effects of investor sophistication on market reaction to managerial myopia. The dependent variable is five-day (adjusted) 
returns surrounding the earnings announcement. Five-day (adjusted) returns are calculated as in Table II. We divide the full sample into two sub-samples: a 
sub-sample of firms with high investor sophistication (High-IS) and a sub-sample of firms with low investor sophistication (Low-IS). A firm is identified as 
being with high (low) investor sophistication if its Inst_Percent is higher (lower) than the sample median. Other variables follow the definitions in Table III. 
Column (1) reports the results of the regression using the raw returns, regressions in Column (2) use the market-adjusted abnormal returns, and regressions in 
Column (3) use the size-adjusted abnormal returns. Heteroskedastic-robust and cluster-adjusted t-statistics appear in brackets. *, **, *** denote two-tailed 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1)  
Raw Returns 
(2) 
Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
(2) 
Size-Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
 High IS Low IS High IS Low IS High IS Low IS 
CutRD -0.024** -0.004 -0.023*** -0.003 -0.031*** -0.002 
 [-3.187] [-0.529] [-3.248] [-0.429] [-4.304] [-0.312] 
ERDSurprise 0.018*** 0.000 0.016** 0.000 0.021*** 0.009 
 [2.819] [0.939] [2.583] [1.335] [3.419] [0.889] 
△RD 0.015** -0.000 0.017** -0.000 0.024*** -0.016 
 [2.029] [-0.119] [2.472] [-0.362] [2.862] [-1.385] 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.004*** 0.003 
 [3.481] [0.866] [1.743] [1.044] [2.930] [1.233] 
BM 0.020** 0.010 0.032*** 0.010 0.046*** 0.017* 
 [2.318] [1.257] [2.518] [1.425] [3.535] [1.883] 
Momentum 0.012 0.025** 0.017 0.022** 0.019 0.004 
 [1.376] [2.100] [1.541] [1.970] [1.637] [0.449] 
Constant -0.055*** -0.042* -0.020 -0.052** -0.030* -0.018 
 [-2.656] [-1.777] [-1.398] [-2.291] [-1.906] [-1.254] 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 962 962 962 962 962 962 
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.004 0.011 0.008 0.019 0.005 
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Table V CEO Compensation and Managerial Myopia 
 
This table presents the results of the association between managerial myopia and CEO compensation. The dependent variables are the change of CEO’s total 
pay, cash pay, and noncash pay. Cash pay is the sum of salary and annual bonus. Noncash pay is the sum of the value of equity grants during the year, fringe 
benefits, and other long-term incentive plans, with stock options valued at the end of the fiscal year using Black-Scholes 1973 model adjusted for dividends. 
Total pay is the sum of cash pay and noncash pay. △ROA is change of ROA. ROA is calculated as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of 
total assets. Q is calculated as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity, scaled by the book value of assets at 
year t. LEV is total debts divided by total assets. Ownership is the CEO ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding. Tenure is the number of years as CEO 
of the firm. RET is annual stock return. In Columns (1), (2), and (3), the dependent variables are CEO’s total pay, cash pay, and noncash pay, respectively. 
Heteroskedastic-robust and cluster-adjusted t-statistics appear in brackets. *, **, *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable △Total Pay △Cash Pay △Noncash Pay 
CutRD 0.194* 0.109** 0.330 
 [1.917] [2.148] [0.547] 
△ROAi,t -0.601 -0.243 -0.868 
 [-1.216] [-0.971] [-1.497] 
RETi,t 0.148 0.159*** -0.073 
 [0.621] [3.009] [1.217] 
SIZEi,t-1 -0.017 0.020 -0.046 
 [-0.871] [0.952] [-1.497] 
Qi,t-1 0.028 -0.011 0.049 
 [1.274] [-0.971] [1.531] 
LEVi,t-1 0.547* 0.076 1.159* 
 [1.947] [0.987] [1.831] 
Ownershipi,t-1 -0.575 1.460*** -4.948** 
 [-0.871] [4.284] [-2.245] 
Tenurei,t 0.010 -0.010** 0.050** 
 [0.462] [-2.127] [2.145] 
Constant -0.297 -0.278 -0.350 
 [-1.232] [-1.031] [-1.409] 
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Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 248 248 248 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.140 0.017 
 
